54th CONFERENCE OF
DIRECTORS GENERAL OF CIVIL AVIATION
ASIA AND PACIFIC REGIONS

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AGENDA ITEM 3:　　　AVIATION SAFETY AND
　　　　　　　　　　　AIR NAVIGATION

RUNWAY SAFETY: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

(Presented by the International Federation of Air Line Pilots Associations)

INFORMATION PAPER

SUMMARY

Runway Safety is a shared responsibility with all key stakeholders taking an active part. This includes the pilots, the aerodrome and the operators and regulators.

RUNWAY SAFETY: A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY

1.   INTRODUCTION

1.1   Runway Safety is a shared responsibility with all key stakeholders taking an active part. This includes the pilots, the aerodrome and the operators and regulators.

2.   DISCUSSION

2.1   It is recognised that uunstabilized approaches increase the risk of landing runway excursions. It is important that Operators should define, publish, and train the elements of a stabilized approach. Crews should recognize that fast and high on approach, high at threshold, and fast, long and hard touchdowns are major factors leading to landing excursions

2.2   Last minute runway changes can cause a loss of situational awareness and rushed approaches. They should be, therefore be avoided. Delayed descent instructions or 'short cuts" when vectoring to the runway allocation or inappropriate speed controls instructions can all cause a rushed approach. It is necessary to emphasize that, in selecting the runway priority should be given to achieve a stabilised approach before noise abatement procedures (or bird activity) are considered

2.3   Even after the stabilized approach, a safe landing is not always guaranteed. There could be burst tyres and thrust-reverser malfunctions — as well as landings outside the touchdown zone related to speed, contaminated runway and wind factors, pilots misjudging and missing high-speed turnoffs, all add pressures to touch down and to keep a relatively high speed to the end of the runway.

2.4   Go-Around from an unstabilized approach should be mandated. Operators should promote a non-punitive policy that encourage crews to go-around if safety is compromised. These occasions should include: unstable approach; runway incursion, runway occupied.

2.5   In the event of a runway excursion runway safety measures need to be in place, this should include a Runway End Safety Area (RESA). ICAO recommends this should extend from the end of a runway strip to a distance of at least:
>   240 m where the code number is 3 or 4; and
>   120 m where the code number is 1 or 2.

2.6   IFALPA proposes that the ICAO recommendation should be adopted a Standard and further recommends the runway end safety area should extend from the end of a runway strip to a distance of at least:
>   240 m where the code number is 1 or 2.

2.7   IFALPA also recognises that at some airports it is impossible to establish an adequate RESA due to the location of the runway and the surrounding terrain and topography. In these cases IFALPA believes that an alternative means of compliance would be the installation of an arrestor bed whose performance allows at least the equivalent level of safety as the recommended RESA.

2.8   In conclusion, IFALPA continues to strive for enhanced runway safety acknowledging the need for combined responsibility. The pilots should prepare and conduct a stable approach, continually evaluating the approach and execute a Go Around if a safe landing is in doubt. Aerodromes should minimise the impacts of a runway excursion with an adequate RESA or install an arresting system. Operators and Regulators need to develop and enhance a non-punitive culture which enables the pilots to have confidence to make the Go-Around decision without adverse consequences.

3.   ACTION BY THE CONFERENCE

3.1   The Conference is invited to note the information contained in this Paper.

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